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Abstract:  
This article contends that a new research avenue is open to comparative economics which is the 
economic comparison between American (closed) and European (open) professional team sports 
leagues. It starts with sketching the major institutional differences between the two leagues systems. 
Then it surveys the American modelling of competitive balance in these sports leagues that objects 
pro-competitive balance regulation as being non Walrasian when (American) teams are profit 
maximising. A next step is to cover how the Walrasian model has been adapted to European open 
leagues and their regulation of win maximising clubs under a hard budget constraint. Such approach 
has recently been outdated by models where win maximising clubs operate with a flexible supply of 
talent in a non cooperative game, given the globalization of the labour market for sporting talent 
(namely after the Bosman case). Finally, the article ploughs into a new research path advocating for a 
disequilibrium model where clubs would have a “soft” budget constraint rooted in their weak 
governance, and empirically tests a vicious circle between TV rights revenues and wages in French 
football that may explain the aforementioned disequilibrium.  
JEL: L83, L21, J42, J31, G30. 
Keywords: sports economics, comparative economics, economic organisation, governance, 
sports leagues, Walrasian model, Nash equilibrium, competitive balance, regulation, soft 
budget constraint, TV rights, wages, profit maximising, win maximising 
What is the future of comparative economics? This question has been with 
us since the collapse of the former communist regimes associated with “socialist 
centrally planned economies”. Various responses have been suggested in the 
literature during the post-communist period of economic transformation and I 
will briefly sketch a few of them below (see section 1). But no one could imagine 
that a possible dividing line between a quasi-socialist system and a deregulated 
market economy were to persist in some area until today, 2010. Had it been so, 
would not all those involved into comparative economics have taken this 
opportunity to prolong the use of their usual economic and institutional tools of 
comparative analysis in that area? Amazing as it may seem, such an area does 
exist and my contribution is devoted to briefly present it as an avenue for new 
comparative economic research.  
There is a dividing line between the North American closed league system 
in professional team sports – a sort of island of regulated “quasi-socialist” 
economy in the middle of a liberal American market capitalism – and the 
European open league system which has rapidly been almost completely 
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deregulated, starting from European football (soccer) in 1995 and spreading 
throughout other European sports and all open professional team sport leagues. 
There are four dimensions along which closed and open team sports leagues can 
be compared: organizational (section 2), in a Walrasian model (section 3), using a 
Nash-equilibrium conjecture (section 4), and through empirical testing (section 
5). I will briefly screen all four. The empirical evidence will show that European 
open leagues differ from North American closed leagues in that teams' budget 
constraints in the former are soft while they are hard in the latter. We thus meet 
Kornaï’s insight in unexpected places. A disequilibrium model would fit open 
leagues better. 
1)  Which future for comparative economic studies? 
Jan Tinbergen (1961) was the first economist and Nobel Prize winner who 
stated and predicted that the core object of comparative economics, capitalism 
versus socialism, would vanish, since the two opposite institutional and economic 
systems may be replaced by a single system. This hypothesis is known as one of 
convergence between economic systems (Andreff, 1992). The collapse of the 
Soviet-type systems between 1989 and 1991 followed by two decades of post-
communist transformation did not exactly confirm Tinbergen’s (and others') 
convergence prognosis. The two former systems did not merge because one of 
them – the Soviet system – was definitely submerged by the other with a 
restoration of a capitalist market economy in former Soviet economies. Did the 
total collapse of the communist system and the associated globalisation of 
capitalism put an end to comparative economics and turn the latter into a branch 
of economic history? Nuti (1999) has contented that “nothing could be further 
from the truth”. Let me offer an elaboration on Nuti’s seven arguments:  
1)  Some Soviet-type economies are surviving in countries like Turkmenistan, 
Tajikistan, North Korea and even Cuba. 
2)  There are countries, namely Vietnam and China, which are neither traditional 
Soviet-type systems, nor post-transitional economies such as Central and 
Eastern European countries which have joined the EU; sooner or later, their 
systemic transformation will become a special case, as Kornaï (2006), who 
adds the Muslim countries to the list, suggested. He concludes that 
‘transitology’ (a variant of comparative economics when a system changes or 
collapses) is not over.  
3)  As long as we have different systems, the question of actual or possible 
transition from one to the other remains a topic for comparative economics, 
since different transition paths have been observed in the 1990s. Even within 
capitalism, institutions evolved in various countries at various speeds (Kornaï, 
2006).  
4)  Within the capitalist system itself, there exist several prototypes of a market 
economy which distinguish the Anglo-American model from a Japanese and Wladimir Andreff, Some comparative economics of the organization of sports: competition and regulation in north 
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South Korean networked version, German Mitbestimmung, and even more so 
(the former French) state capitalism in various developing countries (see also 
Boyer, 1993). On the other hand, it is the way which is now used by 
mainstream economics to re-integrate a liberal analysis of institutions into the 
so-called new comparative economics – see for instance Djankov et al. (2003), 
Glaeser et al. (2001 & 2003), Glaeser & Shleifer (2001, 2002 & 2003), and for 
a criticism Andreff (2006).  
5)  Even economic systems with identical economic institutions may behave very 
differently if their economic policies are systematically (permanently and 
consistently) different – for instance Thatcherite-Reaganite policy as against 
Scandinavian solidarity welfare policies. 
6)  There is some sort of study of economic engineering, i.e. of new or modified 
economic institutions, including yet untried sets of economic institutions 
(“utopias”) as well as historical comparisons, e.g., with ancient economic 
systems and their “great transformation” (Polanyi, 1944). 
7)  History never end up: both single institutions and the systems they form 
evolve continually; in this sense, Karl Marx was the first notable practitioner 
of evolutionary economics through his theory of the development of “modes 
of production” (i.e., economic systems). 
To make Nuti’s listing absolutely comprehensive, I would add another issue 
which also pertains to comparative economics: 
8)  Emerging capitalism exhibits different features, institutions and – in line with 
the evolutionist view – different levels of and paths to economic development 
as compared to already developed fully-fledged capitalist market economies; 
this is exemplified nowadays by the attractiveness of BRICs or BRICS2 to 
comparative economic studies.  
Eleven years after Nuti’s article, many studies in comparative economics 
have drifted towards either economic institutionalism or development economics 
which has translated, since 1997, into a rapid decrease in the number of Econlit-
listed publications belonging to comparative economic systems, as noticed by 
Dallago (2004).  With Nuti’s arguments 2, 4 and 6, it may sound that the future 
of comparative economics lies with institutional economics, while arguments 3 
(including path dependence) and 7 lead comparative economics to combine with 
institutional and development economics into an evolutionary approach. 
Comparative economics comes even closer to development economics if (our) 
argument 8 is accepted. Although Nuti was certainly right saying that post-
communist “transformation has enriched the range of system morphology, and 
has greatly enhanced the importance and significance of the study of comparative 
economic systems, policies and institutions, and their processes of transition and 
evolution”, in the long run, comparative economists might well be left with only 
four countries to study (argument 1) or must become – and specialise as – 
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institutionalists, evolutionists or development economists. Comparative 
economics will be all the more phased out for those who consider Russia (and 
other transition countries) as having made remarkable economic and social 
progress in order to become a “normal country” (Shleifer & Treisman, 2005). 
However, such conclusion is debatable and, for instance, Rosefielde (2005) 
contends that a country like Russia is an abnormal political economy unlikely to 
democratize, westernize or embrace free enterprise any time soon. 
In such a mood, it is crucial to find new avenues for comparative 
economics. I have discovered one of them in studying the economics of sports 
(Andreff 1981 to, among others, Andreff, 1989, 1996, 2001 & 2008; Andreff & 
Staudohar, 2000; Andreff & Szymanski, 2006; Poupaux & Andreff, 2007), 
because professional team sports leagues are not designed, organized, regulated 
and functioning with the same basic characteristics everywhere. On the one hand, 
closed North American sports leagues are exempt from the bulk of legislation 
that applies to any other U.S. industry, while a “quasi-socialist” monopolistic 
regulation is used to make sports leagues profitable to their owners. On the other 
hand, open European sports leagues operate in a more competitive environment 
due to their coverage by the European competition policy. However, since the 
major objective of a European sport club is not profit maximisation and its 
budget constraint is usually soft, some pieces of the former economic analysis of 
planned (shortage) economies seem to be relevant there. This is the story I would 
tell you to convince that the economics of sports, in particular the economics of 
professional team sports leagues, is a new promising area for comparative 
economics.  
2)  An organizational comparison between closed and open team sports 
leagues 
Institutional rules that fix how a professional team sports league is 
organized, regulated and managed can be encapsulated in twelve ‘stylized facts’ 
(Andreff, 2007a; Szymanski, 2003).  
1)  A North American professional team sports league is an independent 
organization which is closed by an entry barrier created by franchise sales; a 
European league, like in soccer, is integrated in a hierarchical structure where 
the national soccer federation supervising the league is itself dependent on an 
international federation. Entry in a closed league is only possible by the 
purchase of an expansion franchise, if there is any for sale, when the new 
entering team’s market and its assigned location are assessed profitable by a 
league commissioner. Moreover, entry in the league cartel must be approved 
by a qualified majority of incumbent teams. Competition can only occur with 
the creation of a rival major league in the same professional sport as another 
closed league. In open leagues, entry relies on a promotion/relegation system, 
but the creation of a second major league in the same professional sport in a 
given country is ruled out by the international federation.  Wladimir Andreff, Some comparative economics of the organization of sports: competition and regulation in north 
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2)  In a closed major league the number and the identity of the teams are fixed, 
whereas a team's upward/downward mobility is ensured by 
promotion/relegation in open leagues: best ranked teams of the second 
division are promoted in first division while last-ranked teams of the first 
division are demoted to second division. Thus from one season to the next 
the identity of some clubs, those demoted and promoted, changes in an open 
league. One team which starts playing in the lowest amateur division can 
climb step by step the whole ladder of the sporting hierarchy, simply due to 
its sporting performance, and end up in the first division, and even qualify for 
a European league. Such a bottom-up route does not exist in a closed league 
system, since the major league is closed downwards.  
3)  In a closed league a team enjoys an absolute exclusivity over a urban area 
where it is the only one (in any given professional sport) allowed to organize a 
major league’s games. Thus each team has a monopoly in the local market for 
its sport shows. If the local market ceases to be profitable, a team can, with 
the league’s agreement, move to another urban area. From their inception up 
to 2005, 48 team relocations have occurred in the four North American major 
leagues (7 in NFL, 9 in NHL, 12 in MLB, and 20 in NBA). In an open league 
there is no such geographical team mobility; mobility is vertical from lower to 
upper divisions and the other way round. There is neither territorial 
exclusivity nor local monopoly of a team in a given sport: in most European 
capitals, more than one team play in the first soccer division.  
4)  Competitive balance is looked for in both closed and open leagues. Labour 
market regulations are the major tool for attempting to reach it in closed 
leagues. Though they exist also in open leagues, labour market regulations are 
supplemented by other instruments. In particular, promotion/relegation 
automatically ensures a partial re-balancing of the sport contest at the end of 
each season by demoting the weakest and promoting the strongest. Moreover 
this system acts as an incentive mechanism: teams exert considerable efforts 
to avoid the sanction (demotion) and gain the reward (promotion); the 
proportion of games high in contention is bigger than in a closed league. On 
the other hand, promotion/relegation is a self-unbalancing process from an 
economic viewpoint and leads to deep economic and financial disparities 
across the league. Being qualified for the Champions League, a team will 
increase its revenues by 20% to 40%. Being relegated to a lower division, a 
team may see its revenues plunge by 75-80% in European soccer while being 
promoted should increase its revenues five times or so.  
5)  A closed league can restrict recruitment rules and players’ mobility since it 
enjoys a monopsony power in the labour market for talent. This occurred 
first in baseball as early as 1879 when a reserve clause was introduced to 
prohibit any player's move from one team to another without the team 
owner’s agreement. Since the 1970s, after several labour conflicts –  strikes 
and lockouts – veterans have obtained a free agent status that takes hold after 
a defined number of years of playing in a major league. However, newcomers 8 
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(young and foreign players) in the league are picked in rookie draft, ranked by 
experts according to their previous sporting performance. In European open 
leagues a reservation system, based first on a lifelong contract until 1968 and 
then on a system of transfer at the end of players' labour contract, had 
restricted players' mobility and their freedom to sign a team. The Bosman 
case (1995) has ruled out all restrictions to player free choice on the European 
labour market for talent. This ruling aligned professional sports with Article 
48 of the Rome Treaty that guarantees free worker mobility to all European 
Union citizens. The Bosman ruling also phased out quotas of national players 
(6 out of 11 in 1995) that a professional soccer team had to field at any game.  
6)  Rookie draft also functions as a reverse-order-of-finish draft (Kahane, 2006). 
Thus, professional team sports is the only industry in North America where 
firms, that is, teams, have a restricted right to choose whom they will hire. 
Team owners in North American major leagues argue that such restriction is 
a must for balancing team sports contests. Hiring players is also quantitatively 
restricted by roster limits. There is no such thing as rookie draft – qualitative 
limitation – or quantitative roster limits in European open leagues. The 
Bosman deregulation of the labour market has triggered high player mobility, 
in particular with regards to superstars. European open leagues have to 
comply with EU competition policy, though team managers have argued 
without success for a sports industry exception, similar to North American 
leagues’ exemption of antitrust law, to escape it.   
7)  Player mobility in closed leagues is all the more limited in that trading for cash 
is restricted or forbidden (since 1960 in NFL and 1976 in MLB), especially for 
superstars. Inter-team player transfers are usually barters, so that team 
competition for hiring the same player is practically nonexistent (Szymanski, 
2004a). In European open leagues most player transfers are transactions in 
cash or monetary settlement, barters and loans of players to another team 
being a rare exception. 
8)  Player working conditions and salaries result from collective bargaining 
between club owners and player trade unions in closed leagues. Some leagues 
(NBA 1983, NFL 1994) have succeeded in bargaining a salary cap which has 
been advocated by club owners as a means to avoid superstar concentration 
in rich teams and maintain a competitive balance. But it is also a lever for 
keeping a league monopsony on the labour market since the reserve clause 
has been abandoned. A luxury tax completes this payroll regulation in some 
leagues. In open leagues with deregulated labour markets (post-Bosman 
Europe), the degree of player unionisation is much lower, collective 
bargaining is much less formalised, and salary caps are rare.  
9)  Pooling TV rights sales at the league level with revenue distribution across 
teams is common practice in closed leagues. A monopoly power is thus 
ensured to the league in the market for its derived product, i.e. televised sport. 
Professional team sports are the only U.S. industry where such cartel Wladimir Andreff, Some comparative economics of the organization of sports: competition and regulation in north 
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behaviour is exempted from anti-trust law ever since the Sports Broadcasting 
Act (1961). Revenues obtained from gate receipts, sponsorship and 
merchandising are also pooled and re-distributed. Local TV revenues are the 
only exception to pooling and re-distribution. TV rights pooling also prevails 
in open leagues with a few exceptions – for instance, soccer TV rights are 
sold by the teams themselves in Greece, Portugal, Spain (and Italy until 2007). 
There is no pooling for sponsorship and merchandising, and gate receipts 
distribution between home and visiting teams has been given up in the 1980s.  
10) Most American sports teams are not stockholding companies whose shares 
are floated on the stock exchange. In the NFL flotation is even absolutely 
forbidden. Club owners do not want to be exposed to the risk of being 
merged or acquired by an outsider – another entry barrier in the closed 
leagues. In European soccer open leagues flotation of team shares has 
developed since the 1990s, even though various teams have been de-listed 
after their shares have floated down (Aglietta et al., 2008).  
11) Being a cartel of teams, a closed league maximizes its profits and shares them 
across teams. Thus it can be assumed that the objective function of North 
American professional sports teams is profit maximization. When a team is 
no longer in the race for playoffs, this financial objective finally gains over 
winning games. In an open league, a team struggling for promotion or 
threatened by demotion usually adopts a win maximization objective (Sloane, 
1971) possibly subject to – it has often been assumed (Késenne, 1996) – a 
balanced budget constraint.  
12) Due to profit maximization in closed leagues, investment in sporting talent is 
only undertaken if it increases revenues more than costs. Unlike big-market 
teams, small-market teams lack profit incentives to build up competitive 
teams that will maximize league revenues; this is another manner in which big 
market-teams subsidize small-market teams in the closed leagues (Fort & 
Quirk, 1995). Promotion-relegation and win-maximization drive teams into 
an arms race – or a rat race à la Akerlof (1976) – in which each team attempts 
to recruit the best players to improve its relative strength compared with 
opponent teams; the latter, in turn, are led to overbid. The problem is that 
such investments in talent are socially efficient only if they upgrade the 
absolute (and not only relative) quality of teams (Lazear & Rosen, 1981), 
which cannot be taken for granted. Since there is only one (or a few) 
winner(s) in the arms race who can recoup their investment costs, an open 
league is always under the threat of generalised cost inflation of salary and 
transfer fees, all the more so because the latter is not slowed down by a profit 
maximization objective. Most big teams are doomed to be in the red in a 
deregulated open league.  10 
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3)  Can a Walrasian equilibrium model explain the stylized facts? 
Since El Hodiri and Quirk (1971) a Walrasian equilibrium model has been 
used to represent a two-team closed league with profit-maximizing and wage-
taker teams in a competitive labour market for talents. Each team i in market of 
size mi maximizes its profit through variations in the quantity of talent ti : 
() ii i Max Max R C π =− ,          ( 1 )  
()
22
2 ,, 0 , 0 0 , 0 , 0
ii i i i
ii i i
ii i i i i
RR R R R
RR m t o r
mt t t t m
∂∂ ∂∂ ∂
=> > < < >
∂∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂
,   (2) 
0
ii i Cs tc =+ ⋅              ( 3 )  
It is assumed that a number of units of homogenous talent are embodied in 
each player, more in superstars than in other players. Then Fort and Quirk (1995, 
p. 1271) “assume that talent is measured in units such that an additional unit of 
talent increases win percent by one unit. Under this convention: 
1 =
∂
∂
i
i
t
w
”              ( 4 )  
Such assumption allows to substitute win percent by the quantity of 
recruited talent in the revenue function Ri of team i. The supply of talent is 
assumed to be fixed (Σi  ti = 1) since the labour market is closed by league 
regulation. With a fixed supply of talent, team owners internalize the following 
externality: recruiting an additional unit of talent will deprive the other team of 
this unit, which will deteriorate the league competitive balance. Team revenue Ri 
is a function of local market size mi, ticket price3 and the number of wins – or 
win percent     wi (therefore of ti). The revenue function is concave in win percent 
and thus wins have a decreasing marginal effect on revenues. The marginal 
revenue of a win, assuming the revenue function is quadratic, 
2
i
ii i i i
b R aw w k ⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ =− + ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
 is: 
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and 
1 = ∑ i i t .                ( 6 )  
Team revenue is increasing in wins until a maximum after which it 
decreases, namely when the team wins the championship. Talent has an increasing 
then a decreasing return. In the team cost function, s is the salary per unit of 
talent and ci0 represents a fixed cost (stadium, management). The equilibrium 
wage is provided by the invisible hand or a Walrasian auctioneer. Team i 
augments its talent recruitment until marginal revenue of talent is equal to its 
marginal cost, the exogenous equilibrium unit wage: 
() , ii i
i
i
Rmt
MRs f o r i
t
∂
== ∀
∂
.        (7) 
Graph 1: Competitive balance with profit maximization 
 
 
Graph 1 shows a big-market team 1 (big team) competing over talent with a 
small-market team 2 (small team) with m1 > m2. Since market 1 is bigger than 
market 2, this creates a revenue disparity between the two teams. For any given 
wage, team 1's demand for talent is bigger than team 2's demand. In equilibrium 
(E*), the sum of the two teams' demand for talent is equal to the supply of talent 12 
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of 1 unit, at equilibrium wage s*. Then the big team recruits more units of talent 
than the small team,  t1 > t2, and the league does not reach the best competitive 
balance (t = 0,5). The league's economic equilibrium is associated with disparities 
in team payrolls. Win likelihoods are uneven, w1 > w2, and the league is 
unbalanced. Economic equilibrium generates competitive imbalance in a closed league.  
The standard model has long been considered the benchmark to assess 
actual North American leagues and, often, to criticize their monopolistic 
regulation as not being able to improve competitive balance and guarantee an 
efficient resource allocation. In particular: 
A. The model validates the invariance principle (Rottenberg, 1956), since 
restriction (reserve clause) of player mobility does not change the distribution of 
talent across teams. Assume that restrictions generate a talent distribution ta ≠  t* 
(Graph 2). Then the marginal revenue of talent is higher in the big than the small 
team: mr1 > mr2. Despite the reserve clause, the two teams can increase their 
profit by trading players, the small team selling talents to the big team until the 
difference in marginal revenues will vanish, in  E*. We are back to the same 
equilibrium as with a free (unrestricted) labour market. From this derives a policy 
recommendation: phase out restrictions on player mobility since they have no 
effect on the competitive balance.  
 
Graph 2: Competitive balance with profit maximization and player mobility restrictions 
 
B. Revenue distribution across teams, through the redistribution of gate 
receipts and TV rights, does not affect the competitive balance and lower 
equilibrium wage. Assume that revenue sharing is such as each team keeps a α 
share of its revenue and distributes a (1 – α) share to the other team. Then team i 
revenue is:       Wladimir Andreff, Some comparative economics of the organization of sports: competition and regulation in north 
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() i i R R α − + α 1           ( 8 )  
Marginal revenue of team i wins is:    
() i i RM RM α − − α 1         ( 9 )  
which, by (5) substituting ti for wi (by 4) becomes:  
( ) () ( ) j j j i i i t b a t b a − α − − − α 1         ( 1 0 )  
that corresponds to MRd1 and MRd2 in Graph 3. 
Graph 3: Competitive balance with profit maximization and revenue sharing 
 
  
Thus, in a two-team model, revenue sharing diminishes both marginal 
revenues in the same proportion and marginal cost must also decrease in the 
same proportion to maintain equal to marginal revenue. Equilibrium wage is 
down by the same proportion. In Ed, the distribution of talent is the same as in 
E*, and the invariance principle is confirmed. Both teams lower their demand for 
talent because they would have to share the revenue from an additional 
recruitment with the other team; lower recruitment is detrimental to game quality 
in the league. A policy recommendation ensues: since revenue sharing does not 14 
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improve competitive balance and since it lowers quality, it should be avoided. 
Note however that if the small team which benefits from revenue redistribution 
would keep this redistributed share to increase its profit instead of investing in 
talent (point A, Graph 3), revenue sharing would alter the competitive balance. 
On the other hand, if the demand for talent decreases more in the big team, 
revenue sharing would improve the competitive balance (Késenne, 2000a). 
C. A salary cap in such model produces a more even talent distribution 
across teams, lowers the wage and inflates owners’ profit, but the wage loss is 
more significant than profit increase because the new market equilibrium diverges 
from the one that maximizes profit (Késenne, 2007). Thus, a salary cap lowers 
overall league revenues. Talent distribution is more even but their allocation is 
not efficient, some players operating below their marginal revenue (Késenne, 
2000b). A salary cap is not recommended in a closed league though it sustains 
small team financial viability.  
The Walrasian model has been adapted to open leagues by Késenne (1996 
& 2000a) through altering three assumptions: a. teams are win maximizers; b. 
therefore they recruit as much talent as possible within their budget constraint; c. 
in a globalized labour market, free entry of players renders the assumption of a 
fixed supply of talent irrelevant. Teams remain wage takers in this market so that: 
i t Max              ( 1 1 )  
( ) 0 . ,
0 = − − i i i i i c t s t m R          ( 1 2 )  
Using the Lagrangian, first order conditions are: 
0 1 = ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
−
∂
∂
λ + s
t
R
i
i
i               ( 1 3 )  
hence    
s s RM
i
i < − = λ
1           ( 1 4 )  
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From (14), the marginal revenue of talent is shown to be lower than its 
marginal cost. For a given unit of talent cost, the team demand for talent that 
maximizes its wins is bigger than if the team were profit maximizing; thus the 
team spends more to recruit more talent (Graph 4). Equation (15) shows that a 
team's demand for talent is no longer given by its marginal revenue curve but by 
its average revenue curve (revenue per unit of talent): R= Ri / ti = s. Equilibrium 
is no longer located in E* (as with profit maximization) but in Ev. The 
equilibrium wage is higher with win maximization (sv > s*) and talent distribution 
is even more uneven, i.e. the league is more unbalanced than in a closed league with 
profit maximizing teams. Overall league revenue is lower than in the latter case 
since all talents between t* and tv play in the big team where their marginal 
revenue is lower than what it would have been in the small team. 
 
Graph 4: Competitive balance with win maximization (compared to profit maximization) 
 
 
In European open leagues, regulation basically relies on TV revenue 
sharing. Assume that in accordance with the sharing agreement team i keeps an α 
share of TV revenues and leaves a (1 – α) share to the other team, with 0,5 ≤ α 
< 1. For win maximising teams, the demand for talent is given by the average 
revenue curve, that is: 
() []
0 1 1
i i
i
r
i c R R t R − α − + α ⎟
⎠
⎞ ⎜
⎝
⎛ =        ( 1 6 )  
where R is team average revenue whose partial derivative with respect to α is: 16 
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The right-hand side of (17) is positive for a big team, its demand curve for 
talent moves downwards when the degree of revenue sharing increases. It is 
negative for the small team whose demand curve for talent moves upwards. If 
the small team's budget is short of funds and it is less endowed with talent, then 
the revenue sharing agreement is competitive balance improving. The invariance principle 
does not hold. Revenue sharing enhances equilibrium wage compared with a no 
revenue sharing situation: players benefit from it in an open league.  
 
Table 1 – Competitive balance (Noll-Scully ratio) in American major sports leagues and the five most 
significant European soccer leagues, 1966/67 – 2005/06 
  1966/67 
to 
1976/77 
to 
1986/87 
to 
1996/97 
to  Average
League 1975/76 1985/86 1995/96 2005/06  1966/2006
North American leagues        
NFL  1.70  1,51  1,48  1,54  1,56 
MLB  1,78 1,81 1,62 1.90 1,78 
NBA  2,71  2,43  2,96  2,77  2,72    
NHL  2,42 2,32 1,82 1,74 2,08 
European soccer leagues       
Premier League (England)  1,44  1,46  1,44  1,61  1,49 
Ligue  1  (France)  1,22 1,45 1.30 1.30 1,32 
Bundesliga (Germany)  1,26  1,45  1,35  1,46  1,38 
Lega  Calcio  (Italy)  1,46 1,39 1,54 1,67 1,51 
Liga de Futbol (Spain)  1,21  1,33  1,47  1,38  1,35 
Source : Kringstad & Gerrard (2007). 
 
In summary, a Walrasian model often passed successfully the econometric 
testing of its assumptions in the case of closed leagues in the past decades. 
However, in more recent years, the results are blurred. Econometric studies of Wladimir Andreff, Some comparative economics of the organization of sports: competition and regulation in north 
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the NFL have shown a weak profit incentive to win (Zimbalist, 2002). Lavoie 
(2005) has stressed financial deficits and team bankruptcies, instead of 
competitive balance, in North American leagues. Downward and Dawson (2000) 
conclude their analysis saying that the standard model has paid too much 
attention to competitive balance. The most striking empirical observation is that 
competitive balance is worse in closed than in open leagues (Buzzachi et al., 2003 
& Table 1), contrary to the expectations of the theoretical model. Empirical 
testing of the standard model for open leagues is at its beginning, but it appears 
that revenue concentration on a few big teams neither deteriorates league 
competitive balance nor game attendance (Szymanski, 2001). Those European 
soccer leagues which have abandoned TV revenue pooling with revenue 
distribution are the most unbalanced (Andreff & Bourg, 2006).  
4)  A comparison within a Nash-equilibrium model 
The Walrasian model has recently been called into question as the relevant 
basis for analysing and comparing closed and open leagues, since the assumption 
of a fixed supply of talent does not hold any longer with labour market 
globalisation after Bosman in open leagues but also in closed leagues (Osborne, 
2006). Szymanski's assumption (2003), that an increase of one talent unit 
augments the win percent by one unit (relation 4 above), for any win percent, is 
not unaffected by this change. Given this assumption, the marginal revenue of a 
win is equal for all teams. When in reality teams of nearly all national leagues 
recruit in a global market, an additional talent hired by one team is no longer lost 
for another team of the same league, if the player is transferred from a foreign or 
lower league. Fixed supply is no longer internalized by teams in their strategies. 
The Walrasian model must be substituted by a non cooperative Nash game, 
where each team's strategy is to fix its quantity of talent without knowing the 
effect of the recruitment choice made by its opponent team (in a two-team 
game). On the other hand, Szymanski (2004b) stresses that in a league of 20 to 30 
teams it is not sensible to assume that teams are wage takers since some teams 
(ex: Manchester United, Chelsea) are much more influential in the market for 
talent: a pure competition model is not relevant.  
In a game whose payoff is winning a prize, the relationship between effort 
and success percent defines a contest success function. A simple representation 
of the latter is a function in which win probability – probable win percent – is a 
ratio between effort (investment in talent) of a team participating to the game and 
overall effort by all teams. In a two-player model, such ratio is:  
2 1
1
1 t t
t
w
+
=          ( 1 8 )  
Differentiating (18):   18 
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Assumption (4) of Walrasian model  1 1
1
= ∂
∂
t
w  implies  1
1
2 − = ∂
∂
t
t  since, 
with a fixed supply of talent, such model is a zero-sum game, one unit of talent 
recruited by team 1 is subtracted to team 2. If so, then (19) becomes:  
2 1 1
1 1
t t t
w
+
=
∂
∂
          ( 2 0 )  
Team 2 has only one response (loosing one unit of talent) to team 1’s 
recruitment strategy in the Walrasian model. The ratio between wins and 
investment in talent (20) is equal to 1 when  t1 + t2 = 1, i.e. with a fixed supply of 
talent. Now, if supply is flexible, one unit of talent recruited by one team is not 
subtracted from the other team, so that  0
1
2 = ∂
∂
t
t  (and  0
2
1 = ∂
∂
t
t ). In a non 
cooperative game, team 2 has various responses to any possible change in team 1 
recruitment strategy.  
For a comparison between the implications of both Walrasian and Nash 
models (Szymanski, 2004b), let us consider the derivative of a quadratic revenue 
function (6) on the quantity of recruited talent. This derivative is equal to: 
()
i
i
i i i t
w
w b a
∂
∂
− .           ( 2 1 )  
Assuming that  1
1
2 − = ∂
∂
t
t  and normalizing total talent to one, (21) 
becomes equal to (5), i.e., marginal revenue is a linear function of wins. If, on the 
contrary, we assume a non-cooperative game, (21) becomes (ai – biwi) wj and 
marginal revenue is no longer a linear function of talent. With two teams, and 
given that 0
1
2 = ∂
∂
t
t , when overall supply of talent is normalized to one, (19) 
simplifies to be equal to v2 and marginal revenue of talent is: (a1 – b1w1) w2. Graph 
5 exhibits the difference between the marginal revenue function of a team 1 win, 
with the Nash conjecture, that is MR1Nash = (a1 – b1w1) w2, and the marginal 
revenue function of talent (which is also the marginal revenue function of a win) 
in the Walrasian model, that is MR1W = a1 – b1 w1. A similar difference shows up 
for team 2. 
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Graph 5 – Nash conjecture and Walrasian equilibrium with profit maximization and a fixed supply of talent 
 
 
Nash equilibrium is in EN, to the left of Walrasian equilibrium E*. If a big 
team recruits more than a small team (t1 > t2), the big team will obtain a lower 
win percent in the non-cooperative game than under the Walrasian model (w1N < 
w1*), and the small team will obtain a higher win percent. The small team imposes 
a stronger externality than the big team because the latter generates more 
significant additional revenue than the small team for any increase in win percent. 
In EN, the marginal revenue of one talent unit is equal in the two teams, but 
marginal revenue of a win is not equal between teams; it is higher in the big team 
than in the small one. Késenne (2007) infers that the Nash equilibrium is not 
efficient because the league's overall revenue could be increased by moving 
talents from the small to the big team but. Yet this will worsen league competitive 
imbalance. 
From this Nash equilibrium model a number of results have been derived 
in the recent contributions: 
A.  The invariance principle does not hold in the non-cooperative game 
(Szymanski, 2003) and gate revenue sharing deteriorates the competitive 
balance with profit maximizing teams (Szymanski & Késenne, 2004). 
However, if the teams are win maximizers, revenue sharing improves 
competitive balance (Késenne, 2005).  
B.  The demand for talent is higher with win maximizing than for profit 
maximizing teams, the sport contest is more unbalanced and the equilibrium 
wage is higher (Késenne, 2006).  
C.  With win maximizing teams, talent distribution is the same under a non-
cooperative game and Walrasian equilibrium (Késenne, 2007). A team which 20 
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intends to win as many games as possible within its budget constraint will 
spend all its revenues on talent recruitment without considering other teams’ 
recruitment strategies. 
A hot debate has followed up the emergence of a Nash model of sports 
leagues. Some economists have contended that the Walrasian model can no 
longer co-exist since only a single general theory of professional sports leagues 
can prevail (Szymanski, 2004b; Késenne, 2006). Others advocate that the 
assumption of a fixed talent supply and Walrasian model are still valid (Eckard, 
2006) and still others claim that the Walrasian model remains relevant for closed 
leagues with profit maximization while the non-cooperative game applies to open 
leagues in which team owners have non cooperative strategies (Fort, 2006). The 
question is still open whether any equilibrium model fits with European open 
leagues. 
5)  European open leagues with a soft budget constraint 
Since open leagues are now essentially deregulated4 and teams basically do 
not aim at profit maximization, an increasing number of professional (soccer) 
teams are running heavy deficits, season after season, and are sinking into very 
deep indebtedness5. However, repeated deficits and increasing debt have not 
driven any of them to bankruptcy since they have been bailed out by banks 
(Spain), occasionally by the State (Italy, 2006), often by TV channels, and they are 
not liquidated even after heavy arrears of payments, of social contribution and of 
taxes (as in France and other European countries). In such a case, economic 
theory says that firms (teams) enjoy a soft budget constraint but also that the 
whole economy functions all the time in disequilibrium. This situation, typical of 
shortage economies (Kornaï, 1980), i.e., former centrally planned economies, can 
also emerge in a number of industries in market economies to which the model 
has been extended (Kornaï et al., 2003). 
4.1. Soft budget constraint: a disequilibrium model of a sports league 
If team i can survive after years of deficit, a soft budget constraint (22) is to 
replace (12): 
( ) 0 c t s e t m R
0
i i i i i i ≤ − − . , ,        ( 2 2 )  
Then the model switches from equilibrium to a disequilibrium regime 
(Andreff, 2009), that is common in a model of excess demand in the labour 
market. Teams attempt to maximize their wins and purchase as much talent as 
                                                 
4 At least much less regulated than North American leagues.  
5 See Journal of Sports Economics 7 (1) 2006 special issue on the financial crisis of European soccer and a part 
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they can since they are not effectively constrained by their budget (in all cases 
when the relationship 22 is strictly negative). Of course, this explains the arms 
race to recruit players as well as a tendency to fuel all the more wage inflation and 
transfer fees when superstars have a monopoly on their specific (non 
substitutable) talents. Then, teams develop an excess aggregated demand for 
talents in the labour market, such that demand grows beyond the point where 
marginal revenue of talent is equal to its equilibrium wage s, so that in 
disequilibrium (23) prevails: 
() s t m R i i i ≤ ,               ( 2 3 )  
With an excess recruitment of talent, most teams – except the winners – 
will not be able to reach the win percent that they would have obtained in an 
equilibrium model. Thus teams will not be able to recoup their recruitment 
expenditures at the end of the season because they will earn less (attendance and 
TV) revenues than expected and less than if they had been the contest winners. 
This will, again and again, fuel excess expenditures s.ti compared to revenues Ri. 
Then, the easiest way for many clubs in the red is to find someone to bail them 
out. A league bargaining TV rights with TV channels and re-distributing TV 
rights revenues across teams is the most usual means to pour more money into 
the deficit team budgets. The most crucial issue for European open leagues is to 
sustain or recover financial balance – much more than competitive balance – in 
teams driven to excess demand for talent in a deregulated global market. A 
further consequence of a soft budget constraint in a market economy is bad 
governance of the firm (team) as long as teams find a way to be bailed out 
(Andreff, 2007c).  
4.2. TV rights revenues / salaries vicious circle that softens team budget 
constraint 
Studies of sport and TV have not yet established a relationship between the 
arms race for superstars and TV rights that ease team revenues in a league with 
win maximizing teams operating under a soft budget constraint. Yet nearly all 
European soccer leagues rely basically on TV rights revenues for their finance 
while an increasing number of teams are in the red (Ascari & Gagnepain, 2006). 
All studies witness a correlation between the rise in TV rights revenues and 
payroll inflation. In an optimistic interpretation of such correlation the following 
virtuous circle is assumed: TV revenues enable teams to pay high salaries in order 
to field highly performing squads whose frequent wins support increased TV 
revenues, and so on and so forth (Baroncelli & Lago, 2006). Italian Calcio, to 
which Baroncelli and Lago refer, is in the deepest financial crisis and hardly 
confirms the idea of such a virtuous circle. It is more realistic to assume a vicious 
circle in which the league, as a monopoly in its sport market, bargains for the 
highest possible TV rights in view of gathering ex post sufficient resources to 
cover uncurbed payroll inflation (and superstar recruitment). If bargaining is 22 
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successful – as is usual – this will sustain the league's finances and bail out teams 
in the red. However, in many soccer leagues, like the French Ligue 1, the 
recruitment strategy financed by TV revenues does not translate into sufficient 
team productivity increases in terms of winning European contests6 to earn big 
enough revenues. Then teams are not a b l e  t o  r e c o u p  their recruitment 
expenditures and the league has to come back to TV channels for bargaining 
even higher TV rights. 
 
TV rights bargaining Æ  Increased team budgets  Æ  Payroll inflation  Æ  Insufficient 
productivity increase (in terms of wins)  Æ  Insignificant revenue increase  Æ Back to 
TV rights bargaining  
 
Now, the causality of the relationship between TV rights revenues and 
payroll has to be tested in order to validate the vicious circle assumption. The test 
is confined to the two French professional soccer leagues7, due to the paucity of 
data about TV rights revenues which hinders an extension of econometric 
verification to other European leagues. Our sample encompasses 213 
observations from 2002-03 up to 2007-08 seasons. If the vicious circle is to be 
confirmed, TV rights revenues are the endogenous variable, and we use a double 
OLS methodology with instrumental variables. The dependent variable TVit   is 
defined as the amount of TV rights revenues of club i in year t. We test whether 
it is explained with three exogenous instrumental variables:  
•  POP 2005, 2005 population of the city where the team is located;  
•  NOT is a variable representing the media notoriety of a team, i.e., the 
team ranking by LFP (the French football league) according to its 
broadcasting performance (LFP utilises this ranking to re-distribute 
20% of TV rights revenues across teams);  
•  DIST is a proxy for the distance that TV channels have to cover in 
order to reach the stadium of different teams in view of broadcasting all 
league games. DIST is measured as team transportation costs (taken 
from team budgets) which is an acceptable proxy since it measures the 
costs incurred for a team to travel to all other stadiums in the league 
(and nearly the same costs fall on a TV channel which moves to all 
stadiums for broadcast purpose). The following model is tested using 
our 213 observation sample:   
it it i i it u NOT c DIST b a.POP   k TV + + + + = . .  
                                                 
6 At least qualifying for the quarter finals in the Champions League and UEFA Cup. 
7 All French professional soccer teams are compelled by law to publish their financial accounts every year 
since the 2002-03 season.  Wladimir Andreff, Some comparative economics of the organization of sports: competition and regulation in north 
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In three other specifications we control for the possible influence of each 
season, the division level (taking Ligue 1 as the reference category) and the seasons 
in three other specifications. Results are available in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: OLS regression of TV rights revenues on instrumental variables 
(I) (II)  (III)  (IV) 
TV rights revenues 
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POP  2005  0.003 0.03**  0.002 0.06*  0.003 0.03**  0.002 0.05** 
DIST  9.73  0.00*** 7.11  0.00*** 9.34  0.00***  6.30  0.00***
NOT -26.53  0.71  -138.45  0.03** -73.29  0.31  -217.86 0.00***
LEAGUE  1)    2)    -7137.80 0.00*** 3)    4)    -7816.28  0.00***
Year 2003-04  5)   6)   7)   8)   -1067.83 0.44 -703.34  0.54 
Year 2004-05  9)    10)    11)    12)    -422.42  0.75  -118.31  0.92 
Year 2005-06  13)   14)   15)   16)    2009.61 0.14  2832.70 0.01***
Year 2006-07  17)    18)    19)    20)    2527.31  0.07*  3751.95  0.00***
Year 2007-08  21)   22)   23)   24)    1684.71 0.23  3139.85 0.01***
Constant  -1323.90  0.23  7243.41  0.00*** -1235.42 0.35  7855.52  0.00***
R2 0.76  0.82  0.77  0.84 
F-stat 220.26  236.64  87.41  122.29 
*** Significant at a 1% threshold; ** at a 5% threshold; * at a 10% threshold. 
 
We then test the relationship between payroll (salaries and compulsory 
social contributions) and the endogenous regressor TV as it is explained in the 
four above mentioned models. Staiger and Stock (1997) have demonstrated that, 
when instrumental happen to be weak, conventional asymptotic results do not 
hold with big samples. If the F-statistic is smaller than 10 with a single 
endogenous regressor, there is a potential issue of weak instrumental variable. To 
be relevant, our test must exhibit F > 10, which is the case.  24 
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Table 3: OLS regression of payroll on predicted TV rights revenues 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Payroll 
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Predicted TV  1.047 0.00***  1.101  0.00***  1.086 0.00***  1.175 0.00*** 
LEAGUE  1)    25)    1419.37  0.22  2)    26)    2415.21  0.04** 
Year 2003-04  3)   27)   4)   28)    709.14 0.62  773.27 0.53 
Year 2004-05  5)    29)    6)    30)    695.07  0.61  793.43  0.51 
Year 2005-06  7)   31)   8)   32)    -1455.02 0.30  -1728.96 0.16 
Year 2006-07  9)    33)    10)    34)    -4539.37  0.00***  -4934.97  0.00*** 
Year 2007-08  11)   35)   12)   36)    -2827.49 0.05**  -3220.82 0.01*** 
Constant  848.51  0.15  -566.08  0.66  1729.91  0.11  -470.50  0.75 
R2 0.77  0.82 0.78  0.83 
F-stat 692.88 484.64  118.90  144.09 
*** Significant at a 1% threshold; ** at a 5% threshold; * at a 10% threshold. 
 
The relationship between the TV variable and the instrumental variables is 
significant in all four models (Table 3). Playing in higher league is also significant. 
The observation year is not significant, except in 2007 and 2008 when a very 
harsh bargain faught by LFP with competing TV channels, led to a new 
agreement in February 2008 which increased TV rights. The relationship between 
payroll and TV rights revenues is significant in all models, and the assumption of 
a vicious circle in which TV rights revenues determine salaries is validated.  
6)  Conclusion 
Closed and open sports leagues can be compared as regards their 
organisation, their uncertainty of outcome (competitive balance) which results 
from league (de۔)regulation in the framework of a standard Walrasian model and 
a non-cooperative game. However, open leagues cannot compare to closed 
leagues with regards to financial variables, and the team recruitment strategies 
that they trigger, because teams’ budget constraint is in effect soft in the former 
and hard in the latter. Furthermore, increased TV rights revenues are bargained 
by the league, which enable teams to inflate their payrolls. All this shows that 
sports economics promises to be a promising area for comparative economics. 
Our conclusions could probably be extended, by further research, beyond 
professional team sports leagues to amateur sports organisation, the commercial Wladimir Andreff, Some comparative economics of the organization of sports: competition and regulation in north 
american vs.european professional team sports leagues 
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sports sector, sports and economic development and, of course, to comparisons 
of the sports economy and its institutional dimensions in post-communist 
countries with its features in developed market economies.  
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